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John Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument is perhaps the most well-known attack on 
computational views of mind. At the center of this argument is a thought experiment in 
which the reader (thinker) is lead to an intuition that computational models of mind are 
deeply flawed due to their syntactic (or formal) nature. In this paper, I argue that the 
resulting intuition of this thought experiment is dampened when the ‘Classical’ program 
contained in the original thought experiment is replaced with a ‘Connectionist’ program. 
The resulting thought experiment – The Korean Room – helps show that the intuitive 
results of Searle’s ‘intuition pump’ can change as a result of relatively small changes in 
what we’re asked to imagine.
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Classical and Connectionist Paradigms of AI 
The view that machines cannot give rise to surprises is due, I believe, to a fallacy 
to which philosophers and mathematicians are particularly subject. This is the 
assumption that as soon as a fact is presented to a mind all consequences of that 
fact spring into the mind simultaneously with it. It is a very useful assumption 
under many circumstances, but one too easily forgets that it is false. 
 
—Alan Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” 
 
 
John Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument is perhaps the most well-known attack on 
computational views of mind. At the center of this argument is a thought experiment in 
which the reader (thinker) is lead to an intuition that computational models of mind are 
deeply flawed due to their syntactic (or formal) nature. In this paper, I’ll argue that the 
resulting intuition of this thought experiment is dampened when the ‘Classical’ program 
contained in the original thought experiment is replaced with a ‘Connectionist’ program. 
My analysis of Searle’s thought experiment will closely follow that of Hofstadter and 
Dennett. After showing a number of variations on Searle’s theme (those Searle gives in 
response to various objections), I’ll give a variation of my own – The Korean Room. My 
purpose in this is to show that an understanding of different computational 
architectures can lead to differing intuitions concerning the prospects of computational 
theories of mind and ‘Strong AI.’ The first chapter will contrast the traditional 
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(or ‘Classical’) computational models of mind with Connectionist (or ‘PDP’, for ‘Parallel 
Distributed Processing’) computational models. With these contrasts in place, I’ll end 
the chapter with an attempt to sidestep the traditional arguments between the 
‘Classical’ and ‘Connectionist’ camps concerning which model is the correct model for 
human cognition. I’ll draw on Andy Clark’s ‘Multiplicity of Mind’ hypothesis to do this. 
The second chapter is then devoted to Searle’s original thought experiment and some of 
its variations. My ultimate goal, again, is to show that the intuitions arising from the 
original Chinese Room thought experiment are not as conclusive as they first might 
appear. This is due to both the semantic status of the computational pieces in 
‘Connectionist’ programs as well as how one decides to present the thought experiment 
itself. 
What is the Computational Theory of Mind? 
The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), as defined by Horst, is the 
combination of two theses. The first thesis is the Representational Theory of Mind 
(RTM), which states “that intentional states such as beliefs and desires are relations 
between a thinker and symbolic representations of the content of the states.”1 For 
example, to believe that it is raining is to be in a certain functional relation to a mental 
representation of the content ‘it is raining’. The particular functional relation 
determines the intentional state (i.e. belief is one type of functional relation, desire is 
another, and so on), and the content is given by the mental representation, which is 
                                                          
1 Horst, Steven, “The Computational Theory of Mind”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 




then manipulated in ways characteristic of the particular intentional state (e.g., belief). 
The second thesis is the Computational Account of Reasoning (CAR). This states that the 
representations referred to in the RTM “have both semantic and syntactic properties, 
and processes of reasoning are performed in ways responsive only to the syntax of the 
symbols”.2  The idea here is that mental representations can retain their semantic 
content while only being manipulated according to their syntactic properties. That is, 
reasoning consists of syntactic, symbol manipulation that at the same time preserves 
semantic relations and values. In order to fully draw out what this all means and 
involves, it will be helpful to discuss (1) what it is to manipulate symbols formally (i.e. 
what a formal system is) and (2) how this relates to the Computational Theory of Mind. 
Then we can compare this with how connectionist systems work. 
What is a Formal System? 
According to Haugeland, every formal system has three essential properties. 
First, they are “token manipulation” games. Second, they are “digital.” And third, they 
are “finitely playable.”3 A “token manipulation” game essentially consists of (1) a set of 
tokens and (2) a set of rules according to which these tokens are manipulated. Games 
such as Chess provide easy examples for formal systems. So for example, the tokens for 
chess are the board’s pieces, and likewise for checkers and tic-tac-toe. These pieces 
need not be standard physical pieces, manipulated simply by moving one’s hand. They 
can be marks on a sheet of paper, lights, or what have you. This is to say that the system 
is neutral on the details of its implementation. So long as the formal nature of the 
                                                          
2 Ibid. 
3 John Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1985), p. 48. 
4 
 
system remains, the system can be made of anything. Formal systems are medium-
independent. “Texas millionaires, for instance, could play chess from their opposing 
penthouses, using thirty-two radio-controlled helicopters and sixty-four local rooftops. 
Or, if they owned an eight-story hotel with eight rooms per floor, they might use 
brightly marked window shades.”4 Non-formal systems do not share this property. For 
example, if the field on which American football is played is halved or made out of ice, 
the result may be hilarious, but it wouldn’t be football in the normal sense. American 
football is not medium independent. Formal systems are. 
These tokens are then manipulated according to a set of rules. These rules can 
include moving, adding, deleting, or altering tokens (by changing what type of token is 
present). In playing Chess, I can move a bishop diagonally across the board, turn a 
“pawn” piece into a “queen” piece if it’s in the right circumstance, or remove certain 
pieces (when they’ve been “captured”). Though there is no circumstance in which I can 
add a piece in chess, another example, tic-tac-toe, consists solely of adding pieces. 
Second, formal games are “digital.” According to Haugeland, “a digital system is 
a set of positive and reliable techniques (methods, devices) for producing and 
reidentifying tokens, or configurations of tokens, from some prespecified set of types.”5 
This means there is a method of producing tokens according to the rules of the system 
(or “writing”) that can work perfectly (the process is “positive”) and does not typically 
fail (the process is “reliable”). Further, the method of identifying (or “reading”) the 
tokens of the system shares these same characteristics (positivity and reliability). This 
                                                          
4 Ibid, p. 58. 
5 Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence, p. 53. 
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method of identifying “implies nothing about understanding (or even recognition) but 
only differentiation by type and position.”6 If the method of producing tokens can be 
labeled “writing” and the method of reidentifying tokens can be called “reading”, then a 
digital system amounts to a process of reading and writing tokens that can work 
perfectly and reliably. Of course, some mediums will be better suited to digital 
processes than others. To distinguish digital mediums from non-digital mediums, 
Haugeland compares Rembrandt’s paintings with Shakespeare’s sonnets. 
Even given the finest care, the paintings are slowly deteriorating; by no 
means are they the same now as when they were new. The poems, by 
contrast, may well have been preserved perfectly. Of course a few may 
have been lost and others miscopied, but we probably have most of them 
exactly the way Shakespeare wrote them—absolutely without a flaw. The 
difference, obviously, is that the alphabet is digital (with the standard 
read/write cycle), whereas paint colors and textures are not.7 
 
The method that is used in the Shakespeare case has the possibility to both read and 
write perfectly, whereas with Rembrandt’s paintings, the best one can do is 
approximate both what is read and what is written. Third, formal systems are “finitely 
playable.” To be finitely playable, a system must be able to be played by a finite being, 
with a finite (typically small) set of primitive abilities (e.g., reading and writing tokens).  
 In order to define a given formal system (or token manipulation game), you need 
three key pieces of information: what the tokens are (including what the types of tokens 
are – e.g. a queen vs. a pawn piece), a starting position for the tokens, and a method of 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 ibid, p. 55. 
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determining what manipulations of tokens are allowed in any given position.8 Some 
formal games have only one starting position, whereas other games may have many 
possible starting positions. To be able to determine what token manipulations are 
allowed in any given position is simply to know the rules of the game. That is, if I know 
the rules of the game, I can accurately deduce what moves are legal from any given 
position. A formal game then proceeds by (1) setting up the starting position of the 
tokens and then (2) manipulating those tokens through the legal moves set out by the 
rules of the game. Many games of this kind have an end goal (obviously chess and 
checkers are examples of this), but this isn’t strictly necessary. 
 Another essential feature of Formal Systems is that the meanings of the tokens 
aren’t implicated in any way in the rules of the system. When we define a formal 
system, nothing rides on any potential meanings of the tokens. The rules of the game 
only rely on or reference the syntactical or formal nature (type and position) of each 
token. Keeping with the chess example, the rules of chess don’t in any way reference 
the role of the queen piece as representative of ‘Queenhood’ or in any way implicate 
the pawn’s subservience to the more royal pieces. The only relevant feature of the 
‘Queen’ piece is the type of token it is. It is a type of token in the game that can be 
moved in certain ways relative to the other tokens, as per the rules of the game. 
Another way to say this is to say that “formal systems are self-contained; the “outside 
world” (anything not included in the current position) is strictly irrelevant.”9 This 
includes the history of the game/system. If we were to completely define chess 
                                                          
8 ibid, p. 49. 
9 ibid, p. 50. 
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formally, we would need a couple tokens outside of the board to indicate any relevant 
historical facts about the game (e.g., whether the king has been moved prior to 
castling).10 
However, formal systems can be (and often are) organized such that the moves 
within the game respect and preserve the meanings of their constituent tokens. The 
pieces of the game are then, not only tokens, but symbols. A token that has an assigned 
or interpreted meaning is often called a symbol.11 Further, an automatic formal system 
is a device in which the moves of the game are carried out without any direct guidance 
from an outside mind. Haugeland gives two essential characteristics of such devices. 
First, some parts of the device are identified as the tokens of the formal system. Second, 
token manipulation according to the rules of the system is carried out automatically.12 
What is the Computational Theory of Mind? (Part 2) 
 The Computational Theory of Mind, then, is the claim that humans are (to a 
significant extent) very complex automatic formal systems. Our mental states are a 
combination of contentful representations that are tokened, and the rules by which 
those representations (the tokens) are created, manipulated, and used. The 
manipulation and usage of tokens only relies on the syntax (or form) of the 
representations while at the same time respecting the content (or meaning) of those 
tokens. Our minds turn out to be a system of symbol shunting, a formal game in which 
the tokens and their process of manipulation drives (intelligent) behavior. These 
                                                          
10 ibid, p. 257 note 2. 
11 John Haugeland, “What is Mind Design?,” in Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial 
Intelligence, ed. John Haugeland (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1997), p. 16. 
12 Haugeland, What is Mind Design?, p. 11. 
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operations can be carried out by a system in which the “drivers” of the process are 
“physically simple” mechanisms. These mechanisms instantiate and carry out the 
operations of the formal system by doing nothing other than obeying the laws of 
physics.  
Semantic Transparency 
 A key feature of this view concerns the fundamental elements on which the 
computations are performed. The units that are manipulated by computational means 
are semantically transparent. Andy Clark defines a semantically transparent system as 
one in which the formal tokens of the system can be given a direct (one-to-one) 
mapping onto categories of ordinary day-to-day discourse. As Clark states, “what this 
means is that the computational operations specified by the algorithm [the set of token 
manipulations that comprises mental activity on the CTM hypothesis] are applied to 
internal representations that are projectibly interpretable as standing for conceptual-
level entities.”13 This means that the tokens of the mental formal system can be given a 
one-to-one mapping to the ordinary categories of discourse. These tokens will then 
represent the very concepts of this mapping. These tokens can be both simple and 
complex. They constitute a ‘language of thought’ or ‘Mentalese’ in which the system 
thinks.14 By contrast, connectionist systems are neither semantically transparent nor 
                                                          
13 Andy Clark, Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed 
Processing (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT, 1989), p. 18. 
14 Following Clark (Microcognition, p. 19-20), I claim that all Classical models are committed to 
both the hypothesis that these systems are semantically transparent and well as the existence 
of the language of thought. 
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posit a language of thought. This will be due to the nature of the fundamental units of 
computation in connectionist systems (more on this later). 
We should also note that the Computational Theory of Mind not only states that 
the input-output profile is of a certain type or that we could simulate our thinking 
through such a formal system, but that the inner-workings of the mind – what 
ultimately creates that input-output profile – is formal symbol manipulation. It is one 
thing to say that an input-output function can be simulated or otherwise duplicated on a 
computer (through some computational means). It’s another to positively claim the 
method by which the mind transforms that input into output. The Computational 
Theory of Mind claims that thinking just is this process of moving around 
representational tokens according to certain syntactical rules.15  
 A couple of merits of this theory follow from this. First, this theory (if correct) 
allows for minds to be explained purely in terms of physical systems. Practically all of 
the parties to the debates surrounding the Computational Theory of Mind agree that 
the mind (or at least intelligence) is to be explained in physical terms. That is, they’re all 
psychological materialists.16 Second, this theory is an empirical hypothesis about how 
minds work. As a result, it implies a broad set of research projects, rising out of a varied 
group of disciplines, some of which are created in direct response to this hypothesis. I’m 
referring, of course, to cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence specifically, which 
                                                          
15 Haugeland, What is Mind Design?, p. 16. 
16 ibid, p. 2. 
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along with neuroscience and linguistics form the larger project of Cognitive Science.17 
Thus the Computational Theory of Mind gives rise to an explicit theory about how minds 
work. 
GOFAI as a Research Project (the logical extension of CTM) 
 The Computational Theory of Mind is often discussed in reference to a set of 
projects in Artificial Intelligence (AI) that developed out of this view of mind. Haugeland 
characterizes the project of Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI) – the 
Classical AI Project – as taking its cue directly from the idea that intelligence and 
reasoning essentially involve formal symbol manipulation. He claims that two ideas are 
essential to all projects within the GOFAI movement. First, “our ability to deal with 
things intelligently is due to our capacity to think about them reasonably (including 
subconscious thinking).” Second, “our capacity to think about things reasonably 
amounts to a faculty for internal “automatic” symbol manipulation.”18 These theses 
about intelligent systems point to the Computational Theory of Mind as the heart of 
GOFAI.  
The Physical-Symbol-System Hypothesis 
 The GOFAI tradition was given an explicit formulation by Herbert Simon and 
Allen Newell’s discussion of Physical Symbol Systems (automatic formal systems). In 
their 1976 paper, “Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search”, Simon 
and Newell put forward an admirably explicit thesis about how intelligent systems work: 
                                                          
17 Gardner, Howard. The Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution (New York: 
Basic, 1985), p. 37. 
18 Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence, p. 113. 
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The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis: A physical symbol system has 
the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action. 
 
By “necessary” we mean that any system that exhibits general 
intelligence will prove upon analysis to be a physical symbol system. By 
“sufficient” we mean that any physical symbol system of sufficient size 
can be organized further to exhibit general intelligence. By “general 
intelligent action” we wish to indicate the same scope of intelligence as 
we see in human action: that in any real situation, behavior appropriate 
to the ends of the system and adaptive to the demands of the 
environment can occur, within some limits of speed and complexity.19  
 
In this definition, not only have Simon and Newell stated that any physical symbol 
system, sufficiently complex and organized, will be intelligent (the sufficient condition), 
but that any intelligent system will turn out to be a physical symbol system, organized in 
some specified way (the necessary condition). This is very strong, for it not only applies 
to human minds (our own signpost for what intelligence is or could be) but this seems to 
apply to all minds or (perhaps more accurately) all intelligent systems. With this explicit 
hypothesis about how intelligence works, one which Simon and Newell describe as an 
empirical thesis of computer science about the nature of intelligence, similar to the 
germ theory in medicine, Simon and Newell started a tradition of research in Artificial 
Intelligence – the GOFAI tradition. 
 For Simon and Newell, the project of A.I. is straight-forward. The first step of 
trying to confirm the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis is to construct computer 
programs (i.e., physical symbol systems) that can do intelligent tasks. Simon and Newell 
compare their project with germ theory:  
                                                          
19 Allen Newell and Herbert Simon, “Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and 
Search,” Communications of the ACM 19, no. 4 (1976): p. 116. 
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The basic paradigm for the initial testing of the germ theory of disease 
was: identify a disease, then look for the germ. An analogous paradigm 
has inspired much of the research in artificial intelligence: identify a task 
domain calling for intelligence, then construct a program for a digital 
computer that can handle tasks in that domain.20 
 
This project (the project of Classical A.I.) works on the sufficiency side of their 
hypothesis. If these A.I. researchers can show that certain types of physical symbol 
systems can carry out tasks requiring intelligence, then they’ve shown that those 
systems will suffice for intelligence. On the other side of the biconditional is the project 
of cognitive science, which examines man’s intellectual capacities and “attempts to 
discover whether his cognitive activity can be explained as the working of a physical 
symbol system.”21 The basic story here is that Simon and Newell take the Computational 
Theory of Mind and begin to create a research project. They lay out an explicit thesis 
about how intelligent systems work then begin a broad research program for to show 
the sufficiency side of their thesis. This program is GOFAI. Again, this program is 
essentially linked to the view of minds as automatic formal systems (CTM). Throughout 
this paper, I will sometimes refer to the larger project of cognitive science that takes the 
Computational Theory of Mind as its foundation as “Classical Cognitivism.” 
 On the more philosophical side of Classical Cognitivism, Jerry Fodor (one of the 
first to put forward the Computational Theory of Mind and the Language of Thought 
hypothesis specifically) claims that the hypothesis of the Computational Theory of Mind 
(with its requisite language of thought) is the only good hypothesis that we have about 
                                                          




how (at least a significant portion of) minds work. Fodor’s claim, essentially, is that 
Classical Cognitivism is “the only game in town.”22 However, many point to 
Connectionist models of cognition as a promising alternative to the Computational 
Theory of Mind and Classical Cognitivism.  
What is Connectionism? 
 While more classical models of cognition are abstracted away from the details of 
implementation, Connectionist models of cognition seek to model intelligent behavior 
with an eye toward those details. The connectionist approach to cognitive models is 
“neurally-inspired.”23 These types of models look at the basic properties of neurons and 
neural networks to create a model that more shares some of those basic properties. 
Such models are variously called “connectionist”, “PDP” (Parallel Distributed 
Processing), or “neural networks”. These models are able to deal with and act on 
information that is incomplete, ambiguous, and error-prone in a flexible way. This is 
largely due to their brand of computational architecture. 
While there are numerous species of Connectionist / PDP models, they all share 
some key traits. In a Connectionist model a set of fundamental computational pieces 
(often called ‘nodes’ or ‘units’) are arranged and connected in a way strongly analogous 
to how neurons connect to one another. These nodes are given some input from other 
                                                          
22 Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought (New York: Crowell, 1975). 
23 David Rumelhart, “The Architecture of Mind: A Connectionist Approach,” in Foundations of 
Cognitive Science, ed. Michael Posner (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1989), p. 206. Reprinted in Mind 
Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, ed. John Haugeland (Cambridge, MA: 




nodes and then they send some output to other nodes. Each node has an activation 
value which determines whether or not the node “fires”. If this activation value 
surpasses a certain threshold (the activation threshold) then it will activate (or “fire”), 
sending an output signal to the connecting nodes down the line. Further, each individual 
connection between nodes has a “weight.” This weight determines both the strength of 
the connection between nodes as well as whether the connection is excitatory or 
inhibitory. A connectionist network, then, consists of a number of these units, each 
working in parallel to the others and each influencing the behavior of the others. Once 
some of the nodes in the network are activated, their activation spreads around the 
network, and, depending on the arrangement of the connections (along with their 
weights), some nodes will tend to be excited and therefore activated while some will 
tend to be inhibited and therefore remain dormant (or unactivated).  
Further, connectionist networks give rise to additional advantages in that they 
are have the following properties: “content addressable memory, graceful degradation, 
default assignment, and generalization.”24 In order to explain these properties and show 
how they come out of a connectionist model, an extended example is in order.25 As will 
become clear, representations can emerge out of the global properties of Connectionist 
networks. 
                                                          
24 Clark, Microcognition, p. 88. 
25 The following example and illustration are taken from Clark Microcognition, p. 86-92. Clark 
borrowed this from David Rumelhart and James McClelland, Parallel Distributed Processing: 





 In Figure 1, a number of gang members are represented in a connectionist 
network. Each person represented has the following properties: name, gang, age, 
education level, marital status, and occupation. In order to prevent too many 
overlapping lines from being drawn, a couple of conventions will hold for this model. 
First, the clouds represent inhibitory groups. That is, there is an inhibitory connection 
from any given member of a cloud to any different member of that cloud. So, if one 
member in a given cloud is activated, then the other members of that cloud will receive 
an inhibitory signal. Second, the lines with arrows at either end indicate that two 
connected nodes are mutually excitatory. In this example, the units are properties of 
people, but this need not be the case. 
16 
 
Name Gang Age Education Marital 
Status 
Occupation 
Art Jet 40s J.H. Single Pusher 
Lance Jet 20s J.H. Single Burglar 
Ralph Jet 30s J.H. Single Pusher 
Rick Shark 30s H.S. Divorced Burglar 
Sam Jet 20s Col. Married Bookie 
Table 1 
  If one were to organize the data pertaining to these five gang members into a 
traditional (GOFAI) data structure, each person would likely be given their own 
structure, with separate memory stores for each property of that person (something 
structurally similar to Table 1). “In a more conventional approach this information would 
be stored at one or several addresses, with retrieval dependent upon knowing the 
address. But a designer may want to make all this information accessible by any 
reasonable route.”26 Connectionist models have just this ability. To see this, note that, in 
the Connectionist model, we can “pull up” the name of a given member in a number of 
ways. For example, if I wanted to find the name of the Single gang member is his 40s, 
the system could easily find that information. First, as input, the nodes for Single and 
40s are activated. This activation would spread to a couple central nodes, which would 
activate three nodes in the central cloud, one of which would be doubly activated 
because it was sent signals by both the node labeled ‘Single’ and the node labeled ‘40s’. 
                                                          
26 Clark, Microcognition, p. 88. 
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Further, this particular node would have the effect of inhibiting the other nodes in the 
cloud. Eventually, through this process of spreading activation, we get the nodes labeled 
‘Art’, ‘Jet’, ‘40s’, ‘J.H.’, ‘Single’, and ‘Pusher’ activated significantly more than the other 
nodes. This same process would occur with varying amounts of input information. In a 
Classical system, the program would have to somehow find the memory address of the 
desired member. In a Connectionist system, all that’s needed is some information that 
uniquely picks out that member. Connectionist systems have a content addressable 
memory that’s typically missing from Classical systems. 
 With this example, in which we have a couple pieces of correct information, a 
GOFAI system could perform just as well (using a technique called hash coding). 
However, if we were to add in errors to our data, the GOFAI system would need to use a 
costly ‘best-match’ search in order to cope with the errors.27 With a connectionist 
structure, the weeding out of errors is done without any extra processes, through the 
use of existent inhibitory connections. Suppose we wanted to find the name of the 
married pusher in his thirties. As it happens, this description doesn’t match anyone. 
There is pusher in his thirties, but he isn’t married. If we tried to activate the three 
nodes labeled ‘Married’, ‘Pusher’, and ‘30s’, a process of spreading activation would 
occur in which the node labeled ‘Married’ would eventually be inhibited, since the 
activation from the node ‘Single’ would be larger and thus inhibit the ‘Married’ node. 
Thus the nodes labeled ‘Ralph’, ‘Jet’, ‘Thirties’, ‘J.H.’, ‘Single’, and ‘Pusher’ would end up 




activated. This trait – the ability for the system to remain resilient and give sensible 
responses in the face of errors in input – is often referred to a graceful degradation.  
Scripts, Schemas, and Frames 
Schank and Abelson gave evidence that we often deploy scripts or schemas for 
dealing with situations or events.28 These scripts or schemas are data structures that 
contain paradigmatic traits of common events or objects. Since we don’t typically have 
the full information about some particular event or object when first exposed, we 
assume ‘default values’ based on the category to which the event or object belongs. All 
of these default values, which comprise what we might call a paradigm case of that 
category, need not be instantiated in any one instance. For example, your schema for a 
kitchen (the ‘ideal’ kitchen) may contain a conventional stove, microwave, two-sink 
station, and dishwasher though you have never encountered a kitchen containing all of 
those appliances. Nevertheless, we use this sort of script or schema in order to fill in 
missing information with what we take to most likely be the case.  
In 1974, Marvin Minsky presented a Classical model through which we can 
understand how such schemas are structured. He defines a ‘Frame’ as a knowledge 
structure in which typical items, events, and situations can be stored with values 
pertaining to the typical properties of those items, events, and situations. As Minsky 
states, “a Frame is a data structure for representing a stereotyped situation, like being in 
                                                          
28 Roger Schank and Robert Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding (Hillsdale, NJ: L. 
Erlbaum Associates, 1977). 
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a certain kind of living room, or going to a child’s birthday party.”29 These data 
structures consist of a number of memory stores that contain the stereotyped situation 
and give the knower something to expect when various situations arise. Further, the 
Frames contain instructions about what to do when an event doesn’t conform to the 
stereotypical expectations. These structures are also flexible in that the ‘default values’ 
can be changed as needed. Frames start out as very imperfect notions of what is typical 
and are further perfected as the knower gathers more information. A vague, and mostly 
incorrect, idea of what a ‘party’ consists in is improved as one goes to more parties. 
Two key aspects of Minsky’s notion of Frames serve to highlight the character of 
the Classical Cognitivist approach to knowledge structure, storage and retrieval. First, 
the knowledge structure of Frames is explicit. There is a separate area of memory which 
contains the properties of the stereotyped event. Second, since these ‘paradigms’ are 
stored explicitly, they are changed through explicit methods. There are operations 
performed on that structure that serve to assign default values, change values, decide 
when enough evidence is present to change a value, recognize that a situation is 
occurring (and thus that a particular Frame applies), and so on. These operations are 
done explicitly within the system. Connectionist systems don’t have any of these 
properties. Continuing with Jets/Sharks example, if I wanted to pull up an “ideal” 
member of the Jet gang in the connectionist model, I could simply activate the node 
labeled ‘Jet’. At the end of a sequence of spreading activation, the nodes corresponding 
to ‘Jet’, ‘20s’, ‘Single’, ‘J.H.’, and ‘Pusher’ would all be activated, though there is no 
                                                          
29  Marvin Minsky, “A Framework for Representing Knowledge,” in Mind Design II: Philosophy, 
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single member of the Jets with all of those traits. Unlike the standard organization for 
Classical models, in which the schema would be set up in advance and then stored in a 
local address alongside knowledge of particulars, the representation for the schema in 
Connectionist systems is not only distributed throughout the system, but was never 
explicitly stored. As Clark notes, “One striking feature of the PDP version [of 
representation storage] is its capacity to generalize in a very flexible way with no need 
for any explicit storage or prior decisions concerning the form of required 
generalizations. The network can give you a typical completion of any pattern you care 
to name if there is some pattern in the data.”30 Not only does this model benefit from 
this distributed (and implicit) storage of schemata, but it also allows for the recognition 
of unpredicted patterns to be found within the data itself. 
The Subsymbolic Paradigm 
 As Smolensky emphasizes, connectionist systems do without one of the key 
features of Classical models: semantic transparency. The fundamental units of 
connectionist systems aren’t semantically transparent and do not straight-forwardly 
represent concepts in the one-to-one way that Classical models do. Rather, 
representations occur as a result of the global behavior of the connections between 
nodes and weights. In the Jets/Sharks example, the representation of an ‘ideal’ Jet isn’t 
contained in any of the nodes. Rather, it’s contained in the global arrangement of the 
system’s weights. In Classical models, the fundamental units are straightforwardly 
symbolic, but Connectionist models are in what Smolensky calls the ‘Subsymbolic 
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Paradigm.’ Smolensky notes that one of the key problems with the “symbolic paradigm 
is quite simply…that it has provided precious little insight into the computational 
organization of the brain.”31 In Connectionist models, the “subsymbolic level is supposed 
to be closer to each of the neural and symbolic levels than they are to each other.”32 
That is, the fundamental units of computation in Connectionist models take place below 
the level of ordinary concepts and above the level of the neuron. The Connectionist’s 
node is a gross simplification of how a neuron functions and is meant to be so. 
The nature of the difference between the ‘symbolic’ paradigm (e.g., Classical 
models) and the ‘subsymbolic’ paradigm (e.g., Connectionist models) concerns the 
semantic status of the fundamental units that are operated on. Clark highlights the 
divide with a question: “The essential difference between the subsymbolic and the 
symbolic approach, as Smolensky paints it, concerns the question, Are the semantically 
interpretable entities the very same objects as those governed by the rules of 
computational manipulation that define the system?”33 For classical models, the answer 
is yes. The entities that are computationally manipulated are those very concepts that 
are manipulated. The units are semantically transparent. For connectionist models, the 
answer is no. The Connectionist modeler “urges that the entities whose behavior is 
governed by the rules of computational manipulation that define the system need not 
share the semantics of the task description. For what is so governed is just the activation 
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32 Ibid. 
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profiles of individual units in a network. And in a highly distributed model these units in 
the end will have no individual semantic interpretation, or at least none that maps 
neatly and projectibly onto our ordinary concepts of the entities to be treated in a 
model of the processing involved.”34 
This apparently contradicts the Jets/Sharks example, in which there were 
semantically transparent nodes (those representing the properties of gang members). 
This is true. However, I used the Jets/Sharks example only to help ease the explanation 
of some key features of connectionist systems. Other models can do without such a 
crutch, as Clark notes above. The Connectionist program promises that all such 
semantically transparent features can be dispersed throughout the system’s nodes and 
system of weights in models that are sufficiently complex. In sufficiently complex 
Connectionist models, all representations are highly-distributed throughout the system. 
Of course, the debate between Classical and Connectionist models of cognition 
rides on more than just the symbolic nature of each program’s computational pieces 
and the implications for representation. However, I need not weigh in on this debate. I 
only need to suppose that an ideal program that’s Connectionist “at bottom” can pass 
the Turing Test. It may be the case, of course, that parts of this fundamentally 
Connectionist system are instantiations of Classical programs. My purposes here will be 
served with a plausible story about how the two paradigms could come together such 
that the system is Connectionist “at bottom.” Andy Clark’s ‘Multiplicity of Mind’ 




provides one such story. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to explicating just what 
he has in mind. 
Classical v. Connectionist Task Domains 
 Connectionist models are simply better for a number of tasks. For example, they 
provide an ability to “shade” the meanings of words in various contexts, as 
demonstrated by McClelland and Kawamoto’s model of language comprehension.35 
With these models, we can better understand how “words seem to take on different 
shades of meaning in a continuously varying fashion, one that seems unspecifiable in 
advance.”36 For example, Clark considers three sentences: 
(1) The boy kicked the ball. 
(2) The ball broke the window. 
(3) He felt a ball in his stomach. 
Each instance of the word ‘ball’ in the first two sentences of course signifies a physical 
object, though the characteristics of each ball may vary widely (e.g. softness, size, color, 
typical use, and material). The third use is of course metaphorical – there’s no physical 
ball in his stomach. A Classical model of language comprehension would likely have to 
allot separate areas of memory for each meaning, assign values to various properties, 
and so on. A Connectionist model, on the other hand, can do all of this with one 
localized set of nodes. Depending on context, a large number of different global 
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(Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1986), p. 272-325. 
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patterns of activation can emerge and vary with the meaning of any one word. Further, 
“there would be no firm, God-given line between literal and metaphorical meaning; the 
metaphorical cases would simply occupy far-flung corners of a semantic-state 
space…Metaphorical understanding, on the present model, is just a limiting case of the 
flexible, organic kind of understanding involved in normal sentence comprehension.”37 
Where the Classical models would have to do this in a serial, linear, and explicit way, 
Connectionist models get all the flexibility of metaphor and language ambiguity without 
paying a heavy computational cost. Further, Connectionist models are typically adept at 
relatively basic cognitive tasks, such as vision and sensorimotor control.38 
However, there remain tasks at which the Classical model remains the best 
model. Clark points to such tasks as “the serial-reasoning tasks of logical inference, the 
temporal-reasoning tasks of conscious planning, and perhaps the systematic-generative 
tasks of language production.”39 The common thread of these sorts of tasks is that they 
involve explicit rule-following of just the type that Classical models are built around. 
Activities that are traditionally in the purview of work in A.I. are just these sorts of 
activities. Playing chess, doing logic, and even conscious attempts to drive a car all 
involve this sort of explicit reasoning.40 
There is a thematic difference between the types of tasks that work best with 
these two models. Clark notes that the tasks that have seen the most success with 
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connectionist modeling are tasks that tend to be evolutionarily prior to those tasks in 
which connectionist system perform poorly. That is, if we were to look at the likely 
order in which cognitive abilities developed in the course of evolution, those tasks at 
which connectionist systems excel come early in the list. Clark gives a list (partially 
drawn from a work on animal cognition) of cognitive tasks that are prior. The list 
includes general abilities like locomotor and manipulative skills, spatial skills, perceptual 
skills, general analogical reasoning, and basic social skills.41 Clark emphasizes that, if we 
look at what he calls the “functional phylogeny of mind,” we notice that early abilities 
are just those at which the connectionist program excels. And just the opposite holds for 
Classical models. 
Clark’s ‘Multiplicity of Mind’ 
Further, Clark notes that most of the talk between the two camps (Classical & 
PDP) assumes that the uniformity assumption is correct. The Uniformity Assumption 
states that “every cognitive achievement is psychologically explicable using only the 
formal apparatus of a single computational architecture.”42 And of course each camp 
believes that their brand of the uniformity assumption is the correct one. The Classical 
Cognitivist believes that all cognitive abilities are explicable with Classical models, and 
the Connectionist believes that those same abilities are only explicable with 
Connectionist models. Clark, however, explores the neglected middle, the notion that 
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Classical models are more accurate for some task domains while Connectionist models 
are right for others. 
Clark, noting the evolutionary relevance of how the task domains are split 
between the two camps, further speculates on the way in which these two models can 
be related. He takes a suggestion from Rumelhart that “three capacities combine to 
allow human beings (who are assumed to be PDP devices at root) to perform complex, 
sequential, symbol-processing tasks. These are: 
(1) a basic PDP pattern-matching capacity, 
(2) a capacity to mentally model our environment  
(3) a capacity to physically manipulate our real environment, and to perceive the 
effects of such manipulations (adapted from Rumelhart, Smolensky, et al. 1986, 
44)”43 
 
The idea here is that we used our ability to model the environment to model the 
definite, serial manipulation of external objects and symbols. This ability then was taken 
on-board as the serial symbol-processing method that Classical Cognitivism represents. 
Our ability to perform very logical and serial kinds of tasks is a result of the recent 
adopting of certain properties of object manipulation. We’ve taken our initial ability to 
manipulate the environment in a serial manner and adapted that ability to our already 
on-board PDP architecture. Further, Clark notes that, if this is the case, our basic 
cognitive apparatus remains a PDP system at its root. Now, it’s just a system that has 
been adapted to use the advantages of doing certain cognitive tasks in a linear, 
systematic way. This is just what we would expect from this sort of evolutionary 
adaptation. As Clark states: 
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Notice, however, that even if some mental models have evolved, our 
basic architecture would remain a PDP system, though cunningly 
configured to make possible certain kinds of sequential, symbolic 
thought. We would not have an architecture purposely built for such 
reasoning. The historical snowball effect…works to kludge an architecture 
chosen for speedy perceptual and sensorimotor processing into 
something capable of some kinds of sequential, conscious reasoning.44 
 
A cognitive system that evolved to carry out certain basic tasks is snowballed into a 
system that can carry out a fundamentally different kind of task. Recently, we’ve 
evolved to carry out explicit and logical kinds of tasks, but we can’t do so whole cloth. 
This must be taken on-board through the use of what we already have. Thus, we remain 
Connectionist or PDP systems at bottom. 
Throughout this paper, I’ll assume that something like Clark’s hypothesis is right, 
that a connectionist system can run Classical Virtual Machines and classical models will 
remain useful for modeling certain processes. However, if this is true, then 
connectionism will still be true “at bottom.” That is, wherever Classical Cognitivist 
models hold, they will only hold because they are being instantiated by connectionist 
models. With this, we can get onto the main point of this paper.
                                                          






Chinese Rooms and Intuition Pumps 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to show that whatever intuitive appeal 
Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment (CR) had begins to fall apart when it’s 
modified such that the room contains a connectionist system, rather than the Classical 
GOFAI system that is contained in Searle’s original Chinese Room. My method will be to 
use Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett’s analysis of CR to explore a number of 
alternate thought experiments that may shed light on what Searle’s own thought 
experiment does. One of these thought experiments (The Korean Room) will be my 
own. I will argue that modifying the Chinese Room such that it contains a Connectionist 
system will go far toward taking the intuitive appeal out of Searle’s original thought 
experiment. 
The Chinese Room 
With the Chinese Room, the primary argument that Searle takes himself to give 
states that ‘Strong AI’ – the thesis that a suitably programmed computer would, in 
virtue of such programming, have a mind in the very sense that we have minds – is 
deeply flawed and mistaken. Specifically, Searle argues that the suitable arrangement of 
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a system with only syntactical properties (a formal system) isn’t sufficient to create 
semantics. Or, applying the system to minds, the system would fail to have 
intentionality (the mental analogue of semantics). His argument, more formally, looks 
like this (from Dennett). 
Proposition 1. Programs are purely formal (i.e., syntactical). 
Proposition 2. Syntax is neither equivalent to nor sufficient by itself for semantics. 
Proposition 3. Minds have mental contents (i.e., semantic contents). 
Conclusion 1. Having a program—any program by itself—is neither sufficient for nor 
equivalent to having a mind.45 
 
Propositions 1 and 3 are largely non-controversial.46 Searle’s primary task then is to 
make the case for Proposition 2. He does this by way of his ‘Chinese Room’ thought 
experiment. 
The thought experiment runs like this. In a room there is a monolingual English 
speaker, who I’ll typically refer to as ‘the demon.’ The demon has in the room with him 
sets of pieces of paper. On these pieces of paper are sets of Chinese symbols and rules 
for the manipulation of those symbols (these rules for manipulation are in English). The 
demon, being monolingual, knows nothing of what the Chinese symbols mean. To the 
demon, “Chinese writing is just so many meaningless squiggles.”47 The demon can only 
distinguish the different types of symbols. The demon is able to manipulate the symbols 
according to the rules he is given. Sheets of paper with Chinese symbols on them enter 
the room. The demon manipulates the symbols and outputs other Chinese symbols, all 
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according to the (English) rules he is given. Unknown to the demon, the input-output 
profile of the room is such that it passes the Chinese version of the Turing Test. Searle’s 
move then is to look for the understanding (or semantics) of the system. Surely the man 
doesn’t know what any of the Chinese symbols mean. To illustrate what’s missing from 
the mind of the demon, Searle considers the demon’s ability with regard to English. The 
demon would surely pass a Turing Test in English, for the very reason that the demon, 
by hypothesis, is a native English speaker and thus understands English just as well as 
any other native speaker. However, the demon also passes a Chinese Turing Test, but 
only because of the program that he runs. With respect to Chinese, the demon “simply 
behave[s] like a computer; [he] perform[s] computational operations on formally 
specified elements. For the purposes of the Chinese [he is] simply an instantiation of the 
computer program.”48 Thus it is claimed that “syntax is neither equivalent to nor 
sufficient by itself for semantics” (i.e. proposition 2 of Searle’s argument). 
The Systems Reply 
Admirably, Searle includes his own answers to a number of objections to his original 
argument and thought experiment. I’ll present the four most common and relevant 
objections and Searle’s replies to give context to my own remarks later on. First, the 
Systems Reply claims that Searle’s thought experiment relies on the failure to make a 
distinction between the man in the room and entire system that the man is a part of. 
When we consider that the man only manipulates symbols according to rules, we 
recognize that the pieces of paper and even the room itself help the system to function 
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properly. It’s further claimed that the man may not understand any of the Chinese 
symbols, but we’re asking the wrong question. It’s the system that should be asked 
about. The correct question then becomes, “Does the system as a whole understand 
Chinese?” The claim then is that the system understands Chinese, although the man 
clearly does not. 
Searle’s reply is simple. Let’s change the thought experiment such that the man 
internalizes the rules and “bits of paper.” The man will then have all of the rules of the 
program internally. With this change, the system is fully contained within the demon. 
“There isn’t anything at all to the system that he does not encompass. We can even get 
rid of the room and suppose he works outdoors. All the same, he understands nothing 
of the Chinese, and a fortiori neither does the system, because there isn’t anything in 
the system that isn’t in him. If he doesn’t understand, then there is no way the system 
could understand because the system is just a part of him.”49 
The Robot Reply 
The Robot Reply attempts to add something to the system. The problem, according 
to this reply, is that the computer doesn’t actually have the right kind of causal 
commerce with the world. If we adjust the thought experiment to take this into 
account, the intuition that there’s no understanding wouldn’t seem so plausible. So let’s 
put the Chinese Room into a robot that can move around the world and interact with 
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the world in much the same way we do, by taking in sensory data, walking, moving 
about, hammering nails, eating, drinking, and so on.50  
Searle’s response to the Robot Reply is much like his response to the Systems Reply: 
change the experiment again. This time, let’s imagine that, as before, the man in the 
room manipulates symbols according to the rules that constitute the given program. 
However, this time the input comes from whatever the robot uses to perceive its 
environment and the outputs go to whatever the robot uses to move around in the 
world. Further, the man transforming these inputs to outputs has no idea that this is 
what the inputs and outputs are for. Searle then claims, predictably, that the primary 
result of the thought experiment remains unchanged. The man still doesn’t understand 
the Chinese symbols. The man in the room is in effect a homunculus of the moving, 
walking, talking robot, yet remains oblivious to the import of his task. He doesn’t 
understand what these Chinese symbols are supposed to refer to. He still lacks 
intentionality. Further, Searle claims that the Robot Reply is admitting that something 
more than simply being the instantiation of a program is sufficient for understanding. 
The Robot Reply is an implicit admission that minds require a certain causal contact with 
the world. This is more than what’s traditionally proposed by advocates of the 
Computational Theory of Mind. 
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The Brain-Simulator Reply 
The Brain-Simulator Reply proposes a more radical change in Searle’s original 
thought experiment. Instead of the man in the room manipulating symbols by the use of 
rules, the room serves to simulate the brain of a Chinese-speaking woman. The brain 
gets inputs, simulates the neural activity of some this native Chinese speaker, and 
outputs the appropriate responses. Surely, if a native Chinese speaker has true 
understanding, this simulation of her brain would have the same understanding. 
Searle takes the suggestion and runs with it. We’re to imagine that this brain-
simulation is occurring by way of a series of water pipes with attached valves. The man 
in the room, then, turns these valves according to some English instructions he is given 
and in this way derives output from input. This series of water pipes, obviously, serves 
as a simulation of a Chinese woman’s brain (the movement of water serving as “firing of 
neurons” and so on). And, as is the theme, Searle claims that there remains no 
understanding within the man or even the system as a whole. Anticipating a Systems 
Reply to go along with the Brain-Simulator Reply, Searle claims that it would do no good 
to make this move even here. He claims that “if we are tempted to adopt what I think is 
the absurd view that somehow the conjunction of man and  water pipes understands, 
remember that in principle the man can internalize the formal structure of the water 
pipes and do all the “neuron firings” in his imagination.”51  
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The Combination Reply 
The final “traditional” reply to consider here is the Combination Reply. Searle 
here anticipates a response that essentially puts together the Systems Reply, the Robot 
Reply, and the Brains-Simulator Reply into one thought experiment. We’re to 
Imagine a robot with a brain-shaped computer lodged in its cranial cavity; 
imagine the computer programmed with all the synapses of a human 
brain; imagine that the whole behavior of the robot is indistinguishable 
from human behavior; and now think of the whole thing as a unified 
system and not just as a computer with inputs and outputs. Surely in such 
a case we would have to ascribe intentionality to a system.52 
Searle claims that we might be warranted in ascribing intentionality to such a robot, yet 
as soon as we’re made aware of the innards of the robot and no longer need intentional 
terms to describe its behavior, we would abandon any such intentional talk. “If we knew 
independently how to account for its behavior without such [intentional] assumptions, 
we should not attribute intentionality to it, especially if we knew it had a formal 
program.”53 
Hofstadter & Dennett’s Analysis of the Chinese Room 
In The Mind’s I, Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett give an analysis of Searle’s 
original thought experiment. They analyze the Chinese Room as an “intuition pump,” a 
story designed to elicit a certain intuition. In this case the intuition concerns how the 
human mind works (or rather, doesn’t work). They find at least five different variables of 





this thought experiment that can be changed to render varying intuitions. Here are the 
five variables: 
1. The material, or “stuff”, out of which the calculations are to be 
performed. In varying thought experiments, Searle has used water and 
pipes (against the brain-simulator reply), cups and balls, and toilet paper 
and stones. In the original Chinese Room, he uses “bits of paper”. 
2. The level at which the program simulates the human brain, from the 
level of the atom to the level of psychological representations. 
3. The size of the entire simulation. It could take place in the size of a 
regular room (a la the original CR), or perhaps inside a human head. 
4. The size of the demon (or agent) carrying out the simulation. The 
original CR uses a normal-sized monolingual English speaker with 
presumably normal intelligence (but perhaps with superhuman 
diligence). 
5. The speed at which the demon works. Of course, this could be the 
speed of light or as a slow as you like.54 
 
And here are Hofstadter and Dennett’s knob settings for Searle’s original thought 
experiment: 
Knob 1: papers and symbols 
Knob 2: concepts and ideas 
Knob 3: room size 
Knob 4: human-sized demon 
Knob 5: slow setting (one operation every few seconds)55 
 
Most importantly, Hofstadter and Dennett also claim that there’s one other variable 
that’s not quite a perfectly-tweakable “knob.” They note that, in the original thought 
experiment, we’re asked to take a certain point of view, that of the man in the Chinese 
Room, performing simple symbolic manipulations without any sense of the meaning of 
his task. They also claim that Searle, in the original CR, “is insistent…that we see this 
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experiment only from the point of view of the demon.”56 Essentially, Searle’s move is to 
convince the reader that there’s one, and only one, good viewpoint to take when trying 
to find understanding of Chinese – the demon’s viewpoint. Hofstadter and Dennett, 
however, insist that the point of view of the system is also a legitimate point of view, 
and further it’s not so obvious that the system as a whole doesn’t understand Chinese. 
This amounts, of course, to the Systems Reply. 
 I’d like to extend this analysis further and claim that Hofstadter and Dennett’s 
five knobs of the Chinese Room serve as something like independent variables of this 
thought experiment, whereas the point of view that one is likely to take is something 
like a dependent variable. That is, the point of view that one is inclined to take in trying 
to find understanding largely depends on just what aspects of the thought experiment 
are emphasized and just what aspects are deemphasized or glossed over. When we turn 
the knobs, other aspects can come to the fore and change where we’re likely to look for 
understanding. In the original Chinese room, the agent (or demon) carrying out the 
simulation is a normal-sized human being. We’re obviously inclined (somehow) to take 
the perspective of those similar to us, and there’s nothing in the original thought 
experiment as familiar to the imaginer as another typical human being. So the person 
within the room is emphasized and brought to the foreground. On the other side, the 
way the program itself is presented serves to mask, or deemphasize, the crucial role 
that the set of formal manipulations plays in the context of the room. This program is 
complex enough to pass the Turing Test, and we’re told that this immense complexity 
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and organization is contained in some “pieces of paper.” Hofstadter and Dennett echo 
this concern: 
 
At the outset, the reader is invited to identify with [the demon] as he 
hand-simulates an existing AI program that can, in a limited way, answer 
questions of a limited sort, in a few limited domains [Schank’s program]. 
Now, for a person to hand-simulate this, or any currently existing AI 
program—that is, to step through it at the level of detail that the 
computer does—would involve days, if not weeks or months, of arduous, 
horrendous boredom. But instead of pointing this out, Searle—as deft at 
distracting the reader’s attention as a practiced magician—switches the 
reader’s image to a hypothetical program that passes the Turing test! He 
has jumped up many levels of competency without so much as a passing 
mention. The reader is again invited to put himself or herself in the shoes 
of the person carrying out the step-by-step simulation, and to “feel the 
lack of understanding” of Chinese. This is the crux of Searle’s argument.57 
 
The point of the view that the reader is invited to take is formed by both the inclusion of 
a conscious human agent and the lack of emphasis in just what is involved in a program 
that can pass the Turing Test. When this point of view (the demon’s) becomes the 
natural and obvious point of view to take, Searle’s work is mostly done. The final step, 
looking for any understanding of Chinese, is bound to succeed. The man clearly doesn’t 
understand Chinese because that’s part of what Searle has the reader imagine in the 
first place. So, Searle’s thought experiment relies crucially having the reader only take 
the viewpoint of the demon. My claim (with Hofstadter and Dennett) is that this is done 
by tweaking the knobs in a particular way (the way just outlined). 
 So, in light of this, let’s look at the Systems Reply and Searle’s response to it. The 
Systems Reply asks us to consider that the man in the room isn’t the only candidate for 
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understanding. If we realize the complexity of the program, and if we understand what 
all would be involved in passing the Turing Test, we would understand that the system 
itself, as instantiated by the man in the room plus the (vast number of) “bits of paper” 
plus whatever serves to deliver input and output, must have a wide range of abilities in 
virtue of its linguistic ability. This program must appear to (for example) remember 
previous bits of conversation, sense sarcasm, and be able to correctly use concepts like 
‘gender,’ ‘hole in one,’ and ‘virtual machine.’ This program would likely even be able to 
give some response to the Chinese Room thought experiment itself. Further, once we 
notice that the demon’s consciousness is largely irrelevant, all of this combines to undo 
exactly what Searle has done. It deemphasizes the role of the demon and emphasizes 
the complex nature of the program (and thus the entire system) itself. So, in response to 
this, what does Searle do? He keeps the demon as central to the thought experiment 
and proceeds to further deemphasize the role of the other parts of the system. Now the 
reader is invited to imagine that this program, complex as it is, is not only hand-
computed by a single person, but is now perfectly contained within the memory of a 
single human agent. Again, here is emphasis on the mental nature of the demon and a 
large pushing-aside of a hypothetical program that passes the Turing Test. Searle, in 
response to the Systems Reply, keeps the focus on the demon and off the program. 
The Chinese Gym 
In light of this analysis, let’s see what if anything is changed by replacing the 
Classical-style program with a Connectionist program. Searle has his own answer to 
Connectionist responses to the Chinese Room. In his 1990 article Is the Brain’s Mind a 
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Computer Program, Searle modifies his original thought experiment again to take 
Connectionist models into account. His new thought experiment, the Chinese Gym, 
claims to add what Connectionists (in this case, Paul and Patricia Churchland) want: 
Imagine that instead of a Chinese room, I have a Chinese gym: a hall 
containing many monolingual, English-speaking men. These men would 
carry out the same operations as the nodes and synapses in a 
connectionist architecture as described by the Churchlands, and the 
outcome would be the same as having one man manipulate symbols 
according to a rule book. No one in the gym speaks a word of Chinese, 
and there is no way for the system as a whole to learn the meanings of 
any Chinese words. Yet with appropriate adjustments, the system could 
give the correct answers to Chinese questions.58 
Searle goes on to claim that, while Connectionist models may provide certain 
advantages with respect to the prospects for Weak AI59, the change in architecture 
makes no difference to his own argument against Strong AI. He claims that there’s no 
difference between a parallel processor and its simulation on a serial processor. Since a 
parallel processor can be simulated with a serial program, both programs are 
computationally equivalent, and therefore there isn’t any relevant difference between 
the two types of models. 
 So, what has Searle done here? Most obviously, Searle has us imagine a large 
number of typical humans (how many?) instead of the singular demon contained in the 
previous two setups. The Chinese Gym could backfire on this very point. If we try to 
imagine the number of people it would take to instantiate a Connectionist network that 
                                                          
58 John Searle, “Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Program?,” Scientific American 262, no. 1 (1990): 
p. 28. – italics are mine. 
59 Weak AI, according to Searle, is the notion that computers are merely a tool to use in 
the study of the mind (Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, p. 419). 
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passes the Turing Test, we might be inclined to take the point of view of the system, 
seeing the individual people as just so many automated pieces of a larger whole. Our 
inclination then would then be to look for understanding in the (behavior of) the 
system. This may result in an intuition that the system itself does have mental 
properties like understanding. However, the Chinese Gym, as Searle presents it, 
discourages such behavior. We’re told that “there is no way for the system as a whole to 
learn the meanings of any Chinese words.” In other words, don’t look at the system. 
We’re encouraged to take the point of view of any single person in the system. Searle 
again deemphasizes the role that program plays by (1) glossing over the fact that the 
Connectionist network in question needs to be complex enough to pass the Turing Test 
and (2) explicitly stating that the system doesn’t understand the meanings of Chinese 
symbols. So, in response to a Connectionist critique of his original thought experiment, 
Searle multiplies the number of beings with which we naturally empathize. However, he 
states that “the outcome would be the same as having one man manipulate symbols 
according to a rule book.” Why doesn’t Searle use this thought experiment? Might this 
alternate thought experiment alter our point of view and thus the resulting intuition 
we’re left with? My claim is that it will. 
The Korean Room 
Consider then The Korean Room. In this room, the demon (another monolingual 
English speaker) begins with a large book containing all the necessary information about 
a large number of nodes (activation thresholds, the placement of connections between 
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nodes, the weight values of those connections, and so on). This information constitutes 
the initial state of a Connectionist program. In addition to this, the demon is given a set 
of directions (in English) to determine when and in what way to change (or create, or 
remove) the weights between nodes. In other words, the demon has access to the 
learning rules of the Connectionist system. The demon receives input in the form of a 
set of initially-activated nodes. He then hand-simulates the spreading activation of the 
system resulting from the input (adding up the values of excitation and inhibitions, 
determining when a nodes has reached the threshold level, and so on). The demon also 
modifies the weights between nodes on the basis of the learning rules, also removing 
and adding nodes when necessary. Questions are then given as input to the room and 
output is given. In this way, the room passes the Korean version of the Turing Test. 
As is probably clear, this is just the original Chinese Room with a Connectionist 
network replacing the Classical-style program. Both pass a version of the Turing Test and 
both feature a single, normal-sized human as the manipulator of the program. Also, 
both feature the program in the form of a book, or many “bits of paper.” All the knobs 
of this thought experiment remain intact with the exception of one. Now the simulation 
is carried out in terms of the Connectionist’s nodes instead of the semantically 
transparent symbols that characterize the traditional approach to AI. In other words, 
I’ve only tweaked knob 2 a bit.60 
                                                          




How does this move from a Classical system to a Connectionist system change the 
results of our thought experiment? In the Chinese Room, the imaginer’s task is to look 
for any understanding of Chinese. Naturally, the first and most obvious place to look is 
in the demon (given that the demon is a normal-sized person and the complexity of the 
program is adequately glossed over). The demon receives sets of Chinese symbols on 
pieces of paper. The demon looks at the symbols and clearly doesn’t understand their 
meanings (though he does differentially respond to syntax). Thus, we ask “Does the man 
in the Chinese Room understand the symbols that come into the room?” Clearly not. 
Does something similar occur in the Korean Room? 
 No, such a question cannot be asked. The demon doesn’t receive semantically 
transparent elements, like those discrete elements that make up Chinese or Korean. The 
demon only learns which nodes in his Connectionist network are activated from the 
outside. Nothing within the input, the calculations, or the output is composed of 
semantically transparent symbols. The entire process, as from the point of view of the 
demon, occurs within the subsymbolic paradigm. Thus the question of whether or not 
the demon understands the relevant language (in this case, Korean) becomes irrelevant. 
Where the demon in the Chinese Room sees just some apparently meaningless marks, 
the demon in the Korean Room doesn’t even get that. It’s of no use to take the point of 
view of the man in the room if we’re looking for understanding. With the change from a 
symbolic program (the Classical program) to a subsymbolic program (the Connectionist 
program), the point of view that Searle wants us to adopt immediately becomes less 
appealing. Of course, Searle’s original thought experiment could have the demon 
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implementing a Turing Machine or some other computational device that doesn’t have 
semantically transparent units. However, Searle’s original thought experiment does 
contain semantically transparent units (at least in the input and output of the system). 
This fact plays to Searle’s desired outcome. 
David Chalmers makes this point in a slightly different way. He rightly notes that 
Searle’s argument applies to both Classical and Connectionist systems because “Searle’s 
argument is aimed at computational systems in general, and connectionist systems are 
computational systems.”61 Both kinds of systems perform computational procedures on 
formally specified elements. However, the difference comes when we notice that, in 
Classical systems, computations take place on elements that are also the elements of 
representation. This is what it means to say that the system is semantically transparent. 
In Connectionist systems, the level of representation takes place above the level of the 
fundamental units of computation. As Chalmers states, “In a symbolic system, the 
computational level coincides with the representational level. In a subsymbolic system, 
the computational level lies beneath the representational level.”62 With the distinction 
in place, Chalmers claims that we give up nothing when we see that the computational 
elements that the demon works on have no semantics. This is built into, and defines, the 
subsymbolic paradigm. In the Korean Room, the fact that the demon doesn’t know what 
                                                          
61 David Chalmers, “Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room,” in The Symbolic and 
Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap, ed. John Dinsmore (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum 
Associates, 1992), p. 37. 
62 Chalmers, Subsymbolic Computation, p. 35 – Chalmers proceeds to reword the distinction 
such that it only talks about “semantically interpretable” elements, so as not to beg the question 
against Searle’s argument that Semantics cannot arise out of Syntax alone. The original 
formulation will serve my purposes here. 
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the nodes mean isn’t a problem. We’re inclined to look elsewhere for understanding 
(semantics) to emerge. This is only plausible on the level of the system (or some proper 
subset of the system that includes more than just the demon).63 
Of course, this is only the first step in emphasizing the program and deemphasizing 
the demon (i.e. undoing Searle’s work). We could go much further. We could start by 
removing the mentality of the demon. For the system to work correctly, all that’s 
needed in the role of the demon is the ability to read, write, and manipulate the 
elements of the system properly.64 With a connectionist system, this is largely a matter 
of calculating when nodes fire and adjusting weight values. We could also emphasize 
the fact that a connectionist program that passes the Turing Test would in some sense 
need to have a “personality.” This output would consist in a possibly unique style of 
answering questions. It may claim that it experienced qualia or even give its own 
intuitions about the Chinese Room. These claims might be given more plausibility if this 
system were imbedded in a robot.65 Tweaking the knobs changes where (and how) 
we’re likely to look for mental features or properties. Doing so in one way (the way I’ve 
suggested) adds more emphasis to the proper topic of conversation – the program(s). 
Doing so the other way (Searle’s way) emphasizes the most irrelevant feature of the 
thought experiment: the mental nature of the demon(s). By simply replacing the 
                                                          
63 I should note here that the brand of Connectionism I’ve assumed in this paper is one in which 
talk of emergent representations and Connectionism as computational is taken as legitimate. A 
brand of Connectionism in which these do not hold would strictly serve my purposes. However, 
using a Connectionism with these commitments serves to highlight the claim that we only need 
to change Searle’s thought experiment slightly in order to modify the resulting intuitions. 
64 I’m using ‘read’ and ‘write’ here in Haugeland’s formal sense, explained in Chapter 1. 




Classical system with a Connectionist system, we’ve gone a long way towards shifting 
our point of view away from the demon.  
What Have I Shown? 
 None of the above goes to show either the promise or shortcomings of any 
model of mind. Rather, the point is that Searle’s ‘intuition pump’ doesn’t generate 
similar intuitions across different computational architectures. This is largely the result 
of how the original thought experiment works: through a convenient emphasis and de-
emphasis of what the reader is asked to imagine. The Korean Room is merely one way 
to tweak the knobs such that Searle’s thought experiment loses its strong intuitive 
appeal. Other, more radical, changes to the Chinese Room do this to a larger extent. The 
Korean Room helps us see that the original Chinese Room represents a very particular 
arrangement of the relevant variables – one peak on the landscape of possible intuition 
pumps. Instead of highlighting places far from the Chinese Room on the landscape, I’ve 
chosen to map out a place close by, in order to survey the local area and see how 
quickly our intuitions can change with relatively small changes in what we’re asked to 
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